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Conventional contracting nowadays has disadvantages for fast-changing high-tech industries 
due to technology and market uncertainty. Observations found that cooperation between firms 
often operates in more innovative ways which were defined by Gilson et al. (2009) as 
‘Contracting for Innovation’. However, their study was conducted in a developed market (i.e. 
the US) and thus the findings can hardly be used to explain what is observed in emerging 
markets which have significantly different industrial and market backgrounds. Using 
qualitative interviews from a case study, this paper aims to investigate contracting for 
innovation practices in a Chinese strategic alliance. Our findings suggest new functions 
compared to those in Gilson et al. (2009). This research has enriched ‘Contracting for 
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 “We want to do something together but we don’t know whether the partner to be 
capable. The contract just let us believe the partner has capabilities to do it.”   
 
“Contract is not important, what important is we have to work cooperatively.” 
 
Rapid technology developments force many companies in fast-changing high-technology 
industries to form strategic alliances (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell and Walter, 1998; Gomes et al., 
2016; Dattée et al., 2017) to rapidly acquire complementary resources and cope with highly 
uncertain industrial environments (Santangelo, 2000). Strategic alliances normally sign formal 
contracts at the start of their cooperation to set out formally enforceable obligations, including 
ex ante and ex post risk allocation provisions for parties involved. After that, contracting 
practice developments may vary depending on specific industrial and firm situations. For 
example, in a fast-changing high-tech industry, formal contracts could bring hold-up problems 
and high switching costs because the inflexibility would hinder alliances in adapting rapid 
changes in technology and market. As such, many high-tech strategic alliances practically use 
innovative approaches of contracting practices. This phenomenon was defined as ‘Contracting 
for Innovation’ by Gilson et al. (2009). The two quotes above are frequent messages we heard 
from our interviews carried out in China – proof of contracting innovation practice appearing 
in China. Investigation of these to enrich the ‘Contracting for Innovation’ theory became one 
of our motivations for conducting this study. 
 
Conventional contracting (i.e. a formal contract) is traditionally used to bind partners of 
upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain. Despite its advantage of allowing both 
parties freely investing in relation-specific assets based on transaction cost theory (Williamson, 
1975), however both parties are inevitably being ‘held-up’: under some unexpected and/or 
imperfect situation, the formal contract may not be completed. In this circumstance, one party 
might take advantage of the contract (i.e. engage in opportunistic behaviors). The hold-up 
problem and opportunism would be intensified when environmental uncertainty is strong 
(Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). In other words, opportunistic behaviors and hold-up problems 
could be serious if no innovative contracting strategies and approaches are being operated in a 
fast-changing industry. 
 
Thus in practice, many high-tech firms are using different forms of informal contracting to 
prevent or minimize opportunistic behaviors and resolve hold-up issues. As mentioned earlier, 
Gilson et al. (2009) undertook pioneering research in this field which observed three cases in 
the US and found that these new ‘contracting for innovation’ agreements contain no formal 
enforceable obligations on either party, rather informally emphasizing mutual dependencies 
and transparencies, information exchange, and learning from each other towards a long and on-
going collaboration. In so doing, these firms are motivated by mutually shared benefits and a 
common understanding of market pressure. They create novel ways of collaborations following 
an iterative pattern to overcome continuing uncertainties and ‘hold-up’ problems. The results 
of Gilson et al. (2009) suggested that a formal contract normally serves as a platform for the 
parties involved to develop subsequent informal contracting practices over the process of their 
cooperation.  
 
Although Gilson et al. (2009)’s study provided insights on contracting for innovation in the US, 
we argue that their findings are not best placed to explain the innovative contracting practices 
in China. As we found from interviewees, contracting may have different or added functions 
in Chinese strategic alliances compared to those in the cases of Gilson et al. (2009), because 
the Chinese market has some different features to those found in a mature market such as in 
the US (Mockler et al., 1999; Fang et al., 2016). The different characteristics of emerging 
markets2 may lead to different behavioral modes for partners in an alliance who consider 
contracting for innovation to grab market opportunities while avoiding or minimizing 
opportunistic risks and hold-up issues (Williamson, 1975; Lavie, 2006; Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007;). We further argue that ‘contracting for innovation’ is created by people participating and 
therefore the role of trust between parties involved should not be overlooked. We therefore aim 
to investigate (via qualitative interviews) different practices of ‘contracting for innovation’ in 
high-tech strategic alliances operating in China and explain why they have some differences 
from the results of Gilson et al. (2009). We have initially examined one case. In this paper, we 
report the findings from this case and provide in-depth contextual discussion to help understand 
the differences. We see our research as a response to the call by Gilson et al. (2009) for more 
research to help prove their ‘plausible’ findings. We conclude with confidence that our research 
results do shed additional light on the complexities of this phenomenon.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide a critical literature review to serve 
as the theoretical foundation of this study. The introduction of the case and data collection are 
carried out in Section 3. In Section 4, the case analysis is facilitated by introducing the industrial 
status and specific technology involved (mobile phone lens technology) and the alliance. The 
data analysis and results are shown in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare our findings with 
these in Gilson et al. (2009). The conclusion, theoretical contributions etc. are summarized in 
Section 6.   
                            
2
 There is an argument that the Chinese market should be categorized as a “Transitional Market” (e.g. Roztocki 
and Weistroffer, 2011) because China is a formerly communist country. However, in this paper we still use the 
broader term, despite Chinese economic development now being quite distant from that of other countries with 
emerging markets. 
   
2. Literature review 
2.1 RBV and competitive advantage in strategic alliance  
Resource-based View (RBV) is one of the most influential theories of strategic alliance in the 
last three decades. RBV aims to answer the question of why firms have different resources, and 
how to obtain them in order to have competitive advantages (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
According to RBV, firms are heterogeneous with regard to their resources/capabilities (Teece 
et al., 1997), but not enough to obtain or sustain all competitive advantages; however, 
competitive advantages can be gained through participating in a longtime, stable and mutual 
trust relationship with strategic alliances (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Two widely-cited 
definitions of strategic alliance express it as:  
 
 “… [an] independently initiated interfirm link that involves exchange, sharing or co-
 development” (Gulati, 1995, p.86); and  
 
 “… [a] purposive strategic relationship between independent firms that share 
 compatible goals, strive for mutual benefits, and acknowledge a high level of mutual 
 dependence” (Mohr and Spekman, 1994, p.135).  
 
These definitions emphasize that value (i.e. competitive advantage) can be created in alliances 
through investing in specific relationships to obtain resource complementarity, knowledge-
sharing and effective governance (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011).  
 
Strategic alliances can generate greater profits for collaborating parties via their business 
cooperation (Asanuma, 1989; Mohr and Spekman, 1994). The excess profits obtained from 
strategic cooperation are defined as relational rents (Schoemaker, 1990; Hagedoorn, 1993), i.e. 
competitive advantages which are created through cooperation. Resource complementarity is 
a fundamental channel for keeping competitive advantage. Resource complementarity refers to 
a set of differential resources jointly shared by the alliance partners in order to carry out 
technologic strategy cooperation, which creates value greater than the total value which 
alliance partners could create alone. Dyer and Singh (1998, p.662) defined it as ‘a supernormal 
profit’ which can only be ‘created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific 
alliance partners’. Through resource complementarity, specific alliance partners can work 
effectively to gain unique relational rent jointly owned between them. The relational rent is 
difficult to imitate in other environments and therefore cannot be separated from its original 
owners. A higher ratio of complementary resources will lead to higher possibility of relational 
rents within a strategic alliance (Dyer, Singh, 1998). 
 
Knowledge sharing is another important channel for keeping competitive advantages. 
Knowledge sharing means transferring and reorganising knowledge between cooperative 
companies, or a paradigm by which alliances can create specificity of knowledge through their 
interactions (Miles et al., 1999). Knowledge sharing can effectively standardise the behavior 
of technologic strategy partners and improve knowledge transfer efficiency (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). As Dyer and Singh (1998) stressed, relational rent can be created between alliances 
through information communication and knowledge sharing. The more invested in knowledge 
sharing the alliances is, the higher the relational rents would be.  
 
Another important channel for creating relational rent is relation-specific investment. In the 
process of alliance cooperation, partners need to invest in specific assets. The three types of 
asset specificity that Williamson (1985) identified in inter-firm relationships are site specificity, 
physical specificity and human specificity, within which investing in human asset specificity 
through communication could be time-consuming but is a kind of material relation-specific 
investment (Gilson et al., 2009). According to assets specificity theory (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Dyer and Singh, 1998), the increase in relation-specific assets/investment can reduce the 
costs in the value chain, expand product differentiation, and accelerate the product development 
cycle. As a result, relational rents are created (Williamson and Oliver, 1991). More investment 
in relation-specific assets can increase the willingness for cooperation, which would increase 
relational rent (Lavie, 2006; Gulati et al., 2009). Relation-specific assets/ investment also relate 
to the duration of safeguards in governance: generally speaking, the longer the governance 
arrangement lasts (i.e. the length of the formal contract), the higher relation-specific 
assets/investment are (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
 
Effective governance can also lead to competitive advantages. Alliances normally sign a formal 
contract at the time of partnership established which provides “formal safeguards and 
determine the distribution of common benefits ex ante” (Lavie, 2006, p. 646). Although the 
formal contract is part of the alliance’s governance arrangements, according to Dyer and Singh 
(1998) that effective governance should include the ability to implement self-enforcement 
governance, either in a formal or informal way without involvement of a third party. Effective 
alliance governance plays a key role in generating relational rents as it sets out good inter-firm 
routines which can facilitate knowledge sharing and effective communication (Lavie, 2006). 
Effective governance can reduce transitional costs and stimulate the value creation of an 
alliance (Williamson and Oliver, 1991). The failure of a strategic alliance may not result from 
lack of complementary resources, but a lack of effective governance (Wei and Long, 2011). As 
such, it is vital for alliances to have good corporate governance, to reduce transitional costs and 
improve performance (Schoemaker, 1990). Dyer and Singh (1998) argued that with higher 
integration in terms of governance, the more relational rents would be generated. However, a 
signed formal contract is not able to cover all ongoing developments (Williamson, 1975, cited 
in Lavie, 2006); in this regard, informal safeguards and trust-building are found to be important 
in preventing opportunistic behavior from alliance partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
 
2.2 Dynamic capabilities and contracting for innovation in technological alliance  
 
From the discussion above, one can see that RBV focuses on inter-firm relationships and 
emphasizes building competitive advantage through creating relational rents from scarce firm-
specific resources. In addition, RBV also encourages firms to explore innovative strategies to 
develop new capabilities by exploiting firms’ existing resources through external networks 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Therefore, from a resource-based perspective, firms/alliances succeed not 
only just because they set out successful investment strategies but also because they can explore 
and implement innovative ways of cooperation to lower costs significantly without 
compromising the quality of products (Teece et al., 1997). This situation particularly applies 
in fast-changing, high-technology industries because some of their assets (e.g. tacit know-how 
and reputation) are “simply not readily tradeable” (Teece et al., 1997, p.514). 
 
Along with rapid development of new and complex technologies in the last two decades, the 
high-tech industry has been very fragile, with incredible uncertainty and risks, and faces huge 
challenges in finding innovative ways to sustain itself. As such, scholars such as Leonard-
Barton (1992) and Teece et al. (1997, p.516) used the term ‘dynamic capabilities’ to describe 
whether these industries/firms have the ability to “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to address rapidly changing environments”. In other words, firms or 
alliances with dynamic capabilities would adapt novel strategies and approaches to maintain 
their competitive advantage amid furious global competition (Anand et al., 2010). For high-
tech companies, to keep dynamic capabilities and their cutting-edge technologies means they 
must think proactively, do business innovatively and respond quickly to changing market 
demand.   
 
Changes in behaviors and business models in the technology industry have challenged the 
conventional theory of vertical integration, which defines the boundary of upstream and 
downstream firms in the supply chain, and required changes from traditional practices of 
contracting to what Gilson et al. (2009) labelled ‘contracting for innovation’. Observing three 
cases in the US (Deere-Stanadyne, Apple-SCI and Warner-Lambert-Ligand), Gilson et al. 
(2009, p.437) found that many previously in-house transactions are now outsourced through 
agreements between firms or even overseas alliances to avoid uncertainty in the market (Prado 
et al., 2009), and this kind of collaboration, on one hand, causes ‘unavoidable mutual 
vulnerabilities’ to alliance partners; however on the other hand, it motivates them to find novel 
ways of collaboration, including new contractual governance, to overcome continuing 
uncertainties and ‘hold-up’ problems. They named this phenomenon the vertically 
disintegrated economy.     
 
According to Gilson et al. (2009), unlike conventional contracting, which explicitly sets out 
formally enforceable obligations including risk allocation provisions for parties involved, the 
new ‘contracting for innovation’ agreements contain no formal enforceable obligations on 
either party, rather informally emphasizing mutual dependencies and transparencies, 
information exchanges and learning from each other towards a long and ongoing collaboration. 
Three transaction characteristics with these new contracts are summarised by them as  
 (1) the contracted ‘product’ is a high-tech one that can hardly be specified 
 beforehand/ex  ante;  
 (2) none of the parties involved can develop this product alone or develop it cost-
 effectively;  
 (3) the transactions will be iterative, which requires continuing communication, co-
 design, mutual specification and development through monitoring and learning the 
 partner’s capabilities (Gilson et al. identified these as the relation-specific 
 investments).  
 
Gilson et al. (2009, p.449) argued that these iterative and cooperative contracts can play an 
important role in linking participants as a ‘coordination cascade’- “an innovation by one party 
that requires coordination with a second party, whose response then requires adjustment by and 
further coordination with the first party”. 3  
 
The Deere-Stanadyne case in Gilson et al. (2009) has similarities and differences with the case 
in this paper and these will be discussed later. In sum, their pioneering research highlighted 
three important elements in contracting for innovation in technologic alliance collaborations:  
(1) formal contracting can be important to facilitate informal contracting structures 
which guides the participants’ expectations for capability, cooperation, and trust;  
(2) the structure of the innovative contracts mainly depends on whether there is 
foreseeable cooperation in the long run; if yes, then co-design of the prototypical design 
and adaptation has to address ongoing 'hold-up' problems associated with relation-
specific investment;   
                            
3 Mergel (2016) described this process in more detail in regards to a governmental project. 
(3) in the process of project operation, the alliances must generally rely on informal 
arrangements to constrain opportunistic behaviors through value created by 
renegotiation. In short, both formal contracts with constraints on parties involved and 
informal agreements with no substantial constraints play important roles in 
safeguarding against opportunist behaviors and reducing hold-up risks in alliance 
collaborations.    
 
3. Methodology  
This research focuses on the effects of environmental uncertainty on innovative contracting 
behavior in technological alliances. After decades of dramatic development, China, especially 
its coastal area, is an ideal place for this kind of research because so many world-class large 
companies have come and worked with their local partners in the supply chain for years. In 
quite a few of these newly developed areas, such as smartphone parts manufacturing, Chinese 
companies working with manufacturing giants (e.g. Apple, Sony and Samsung) have earned 
competitive positions in the market to keep their cutting-edge technology. The contracting 
practices within this environment usually have two prominent characteristics:  
1) all contracting parties are familiar with the fast development, and their contracts are 
more based on expectations than on realities;  
2) the industrial supporting environment is convenient for iterated communications and 
more challenging contracts tend to be found. In other words, the contracting behavior 
observed under this circumstance may embody more environmental effects that are 
difficult to find elsewhere.  
 
As the objective of this paper is to initially investigate the practice of ‘contracting for 
innovation’ in a Chinese high-tech strategic alliance, a single case study is an appropriate 
research design. By applying the case study method, the complexity of the strategic and 
practical decisions on the issues investigated can be explained (Ghauri, 2004); that is, the 
details of contracting, cooperation and trust building can be more effectively investigated by 
case study. The case study design is widely used in management research and has been 
developed by scholars such as Eisenhardt (1989) and Doz and Yves (1996) after Strauss (1987).  
 
3.1 Case selection 
 
Similar to the sample selection approach used in Wei et al. (2015), a ‘multilevel approach’ was 
used in the study. Level 1 is to consider the location. The Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River 
Delta are the two most developed coastal areas in China and have attracted thousands of large 
global companies to establish their strategy alliances there. The first author’s affiliation is 
located in Yangtze River Delta and he has about 150 MBA students working in different 
companies/organizations in this area, which provided a convenience sample for the study. 
 
Level 2 is to consider the industry. After a brief investigation of the 150 MBA students’ 
companies/organizations, potential cases of contracting for innovation were found from various 
industries, such as auto parts, engine and ICT industries. Among them, the ICT industry seems  
to be the fastest-developing industry and faces the greatest uncertainty, e.g. smartphone 
upgrades in the last decade. The USA, Japan, Korea and more recently China play leading roles 
worldwide while leading brands such as Apple, Samsung and Sony produce parts in Chinese 
alliances. We thus targeted the ICT industry and five firms were selected in the first round. 
After screening their business activities and performance, as well as the background of 
collaborative partners, three alliances were shortlisted for more detailed investigations. In the 
last stage the alliance between Sunny Optical Technology Co. (SOT) in China and Omni Vision 
(OV) in the USA was selected because their contracting practices are more traceable than in 
the other two cases. Specifically, SOT was chosen based on the theoretical sampling principle, 
as it conforms to the criteria for a polar case, which represents a theoretically fruitful and 
extreme situation (Eisenhardt, 1989).                 
 
SOT has about 5,000 employees, of whom 200 are full time R&D personnel and 260 are 
installation engineers. The core product of SOT is a mobile phone camera module (CM). SOT’s 
parent company, Sunny Group, started to develop and produce lenses in 1991, mobile phone 
lenses in 2000 and whole lens modules in 2004. SOT was established in 2006 as a part of the 
Sunny Group’s expansion strategy. Omni Vision (OV), the strategic alliance partner of SOT, 
which was established in 1995 and is headquartered in central Silicon Valley, exerts great 
influence on SOT. OV is the leader in developing high-quality sensors, and the largest sensor 
manufacturer, with a one-third share of the world market. The strategic cooperation between 
OV and SOT started in 2009. The alliance produces mobile phone CMs jointly: one side (OV) 
provides sensors and the other side (SOT) packages sensors with other parts.4  
 
Figure 1 shows the growing trend (total sales, profit and loss) of SOT’s parent company (Sunny 
Group) covering the period of our study, which was listed in Hong Kong stock market (Sunny 
Optical: HK2382). The sales are mainly composed of those from SOT and the sister company 
which produces lenses. The sales of SOT are growing almost at a fixed proportion of the sales 
                            
4
 A mobile phone camera module consists of a lens, sensor, backend integrated circuit (IC) and flexible printed 
circuit (FPC). The core component of a CM is the sensor (accounting for nearly half the cost). The technique of 
packaging the 4 parts together requires two methods: one is chip on board (COB) (installing silicon wafers and 
then protectively sealing them) and the other is chip scale package (CSP) (packaging the installed chips). The 
process of COB requires a stricter environment: the operation is performed directly on microchips and so the 
production line room/s must be under negative pressure and totally dust-free. The packaging requires the lens 
being closely aligned with the sensor, and only high-precision matching can ensure good quality of products. 
of the listed parent company.  
 
<Figure 1 insert here> 
 
Alliance cooperation is prevalent amongst sensor-makers; SOT was selected by OV as its most 
important cooperator because of its production capacity. (SOT owned about 60% of the COB 
production lines in China as of 2010.) The competitive advantage of a module depends on 
matching effects between sensor and CSP, which in turn requires iterative cooperation between 
the sensor maker (OV) and the packager (SOT) as early as when the sensor is being designed. 
As such, the alliance between OV and SOT would offer us insights into their iterative 
cooperation and the details of contracting for innovation, because  
(1) SOT serves the newly-developed smartphone industry in a hugely uncertain 
environment;  
(2) OV is the world's leading chip producer; and  
(3) the alliance supplies modules to world-leading brands such as Samsung, Sony and 
more Huawei.  
 
Additionally, if OV intended to exert pressure on contracts for innovation on SOT, then how 
did SOT respond to this and how did both parties interact in the on-going process of cooperation 
to overcome what literature identified as hold-up issues? We therefore believe that the contracts 
between OV and SOT can enrich our understanding of the idea of ‘Contracting for Innovation’ 
raised by Gilson et al. (2009).  
 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
 
The chief marketing manager of SOT (recently promoted to the position of vice general 
manager) is one of the MBA students supervised by the first author of this paper, and 
participates in all negotiations of contracts with OV. This vital contact allowed us to get access 
to rich information and key insights into the contracting and collaborating practices. The 
process of data collection and analysis can be summarized into five steps:  
 
(1) Desk-based data collection  
 
Before collecting primary data, we used the public search engines (Baidu and Google and other 
databases) to compile basic information on the ICT industry and mobile phone camera module 
(CM) technology. After this, we searched the websites of SOT about their strategies, values, 
business module, products, procedures, financial performance, marketing, R&D, suppliers and 
clients, international cooperation partners and events, comments from stakeholders, etc. We 
also accessed some hardcopy materials about OV and SOT during this stage. In total, the 
information collected would have filled more than 300 pages of A4 size paper in normal type. 
After a brief analysis of this information, we obtained an overall view of the ICT industry and 
technology of mobile phone CMs, and the background of OV and SOT. Based on this 
knowledge, an initial pilot interview outline was developed.  
 
(2) Pilot interview  
 
After forming an initial understanding of SOT’s business, we carried out a pilot interview with 
two SOT managers separately, the marketing and R&D managers (both are chief managers in 
their departments). The main aim of the pilot interview was to understand more about SOT’s 
cooperation journey with OV, in order to prepare revised semi-structured interview outlines for 
our formal interviews. The time spent on the two interviews was 90 minutes each. We took 
them separately to ensure neither was influenced by the other. The focus in the interview with 
the chief marketing manager was on the issues relating to the market uncertainty of mobile 
phone CM industry; the intention of OV and SOT’s strategic cooperation, the market positions 
of each side, the relational and institutional environments of SOT and the successes and 
problems of this cooperation in terms of marketing performance. At the interview with the chief 
R&D project manager, our interest was generally on the technologic strengths and weaknesses 
of each side; the impact of the cooperation relating to technologic development, the problems 
they encountered and the communication methods used to resolve these problems, and the 
extent of satisfaction as a result of these exchanges and communications on both sides. After 
this pilot interview, we had a clear understanding of the total journey of the OV-SOT alliance; 
the industrial environment of mobile phone CMs, and the dynamic capabilities of both OV and 
SOT. This understanding helped us pick out the problems requiring further focus in the formal 
interviews.    
 
(3) Formal interviews and field observations  
 
After finalizing the interview outlines, the formal interview was carried out in the form of a 
focus group. The interviewees included the General Manager of SOT, and the two managers in 
the pilot. The rationale for selecting these three was that they are key personnel in SOT, 
responsible for strategic issues (the General Manager), production (the R&D Chief Manager) 
and sales (the Marketing Chief Manager). From the pilot interview, we learned more in relation 
to technology and marketing aspects, but not at a strategic level. Two advantages of the focus 
group format are that the participants can inspire each other from conversing as a group, and 
that the researcher can collect rich data in one place (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). The focus 
discussion provided a whole picture of the OV-SOT alliance cooperation and event details for 
us to analyze. The focus interview lasted for two hours and was recorded with a recording pen. 
The first two authors also had an opportunity to visit the site, production lines and different 
departments, and were given some internal documents to help understand some of the issues 
discussed at the focus interview.  
        
(4) Peer confirmation  
 
After collecting data from SOT, we arranged two short interviews (each around 45 minutes) 
with two external peers (one is an independent director and another is a general manager) from 
other enterprises in the same (ICT) industry. The purpose of the external interviews was: (1) to 
understand the environmental and industrial atmosphere from other viewpoints and (2) to 
collect peers’ perceptions on the OV-SOT cooperation, not only to achieve data triangulation 
but also to independently assess the value of the alliance. Satisfactorily, the peers’ observations 
complemented the facts from the SOT data collection.   
 
(5) Focused update interviews 
 
We carried out focused update interviews recently during the stage of paper revision after 
receiving constructive comments from anonymous reviewers. During the period between 20 
July and 15 August, 2017, the first author interviewed the general manager (same person as in 
the formal interview) and the vice general manager (previously market manager) of SOT by 
telephone. On the vice general manager’s recommendation, we also contacted the market 
manager of OV by e-mail with a number of questions, and received prompt and satisfactory 
answers.     
 The focused update interviews concentrated on the issues around contracting and innovation 
in the OV-SOT alliance, covering the contents of the contracts, the relationship between formal 
and informal contracts and their substantial constrains and functions, the forms and contents of 
relation-specific investment for innovation purpose, the interviewees’ personal perspectives on 
opportunism and hold-up affairs, and the effects influenced by environment and cooperation. 
The focused update interviews not only confirmed our perceptions but also provided us with 
much more details about their contracting practices which support and add value to the 
‘Contracting for Innovation’ theory in Gilson et al. (2009). Before the interviews, we had been 
concerned some issues in relation to hold-up and opportunism might be sensitive; however, 
both parties were very open and frank to talk about these issues. This allows us to grasp the 
essence of their interactions on the matters.  Table 1 specifies the process and contents in each 
step of data collection.    
          
<Table1 insert here> 
 
4.  Results  
4.1 Industrial environment and alliance of OV-SOT 
 
The last decade has witnessed the explosive development of the world smartphone industry 
SOV is associated with, accompanying with large uncertainties. These uncertainties are mainly 
caused by unknown future technological development, and in some circumstances, today’s 
technological advantages could quickly become tomorrow’s technological burdens. One can 
understand this situation by looking at how some famous smartphone makers (e.g. Sony, 
Samsung and Huawei) have had ups and downs in the world market. Generally, a fast and 
newly-developed industry would bring uncertainty to suppliers because production lines and 
supply chain need time to take shape. If product demands quickly fade out, the huge 
investments on equipment will become sunk costs. This kind of industrial uncertainty requires 
technological firms to working with innovative strategies.   
 
Global industrial uncertainty alarms Chinese firms, even though the smartphone industry in 
China has been in a strong position in the last decade and is still expanding currently. Compared 
to its counterparts worldwide, China has invested much more in domestic companies in order 
to attract foreign investment and also provided the industrial supporting policies mentioned 
earlier. It is in this industrial environment that SOT and OV developed their strategic 
cooperation in 2009. Both parties want to establish a closer and flexible cooperation 
relationship,  whereby SOT can obtain quantities of chips whenever they want from OV, of  
quality superior to other suppliers. It is SOT which takes the risks of market volatility. 
 
Only when a lens from SOT is perfectly matched with the sensors from OV can the whole be 
used as a constructed CM. Complicated adjustment is thus needed after the lens and chips have 
been assembled, which requires close communications and coordination between SOT and OV: 
e.g., SOT needs to contact the chip manufacturers directly, discussing potential components in 
the design stage and identifying specific parameters. Thanks to the early market entry of SOT 
and OV’s investment in the Chinese market, both sides have a good understanding of each 
other’s businesses. Also, because the chip and the lens are two important parts in the lens 
module, the interaction and communications between SOT and OV are frequent and intensive, 
which helped smooth the strategic cooperation.  
 
The alliance partnership with OV has brought SOT huge profits. The general manager of SOT 
regards the formation of the alliance with OV as “absolutely the right decision”, which led 
SOT’s business to develop rapidly. The marketing manager of SOT stressed:    
 
“Environmental uncertainty brought OV and SOT together. Otherwise I don’t think 
we need to form a strategic alliance with other companies, and I also knew OV would 
not choose us as their partner. The uncertainty also ties us firmly and we have to 
cooperate closely. In my opinion, the environmental uncertainty plays the 
fundamental role in acquiring competitive advantages for both sides.” 
 
The remark of the marketing manager from SOT reflects the reality that environmental 
uncertainty is the vital factor in the forming of the OV-SOT alliance and the close cooperation 
relationship - a kind of relational rent as indicated in Dyer and Singh (1998) and Lavie (2006). 
In the process of forming the alliance and sequent cooperation, there has been a two-way 
communication mechanism in operation with which one can see the development of 
contracting for innovation in the alliance. The process also showed that relational investments 
and institutional resources stressed by theory of dynamic capabilities (e.g. Teece et al., 1997) 
demonstrate key roles in generating competitive advantage. In the following part, we will 
reveal the influence of environmental uncertainty on OV-SOT contracting practice for 
innovation with the consideration of contribution of RBV and dynamic capabilities.  
 
 
4.2 Contracting for alliancing and innovation 
 
(1) Motivation for forming strategic alliance 
 A fast-expanding market is a double-edged sword, especially for the ICT industry with its large 
investments on equipment. From SOT’s perspective, the primary reason for forming the 
strategic alliance with OV is for fast development. “Without the cooperation with OV, we 
would not have developed so quickly,” said the marketing manager. However, SOT knows 
clearly that market expansion also means potential risk. The SOT managers interviewed 
explained the investment dilemma in this industry: on one hand, the ICT industry has a long 
investment recovery period because of extensive investment; on the other hand, the volatility 
in the industry often causes turbulence in market demand and technique changes. Therefore, 
any investment in this sector faces high risks. Module suppliers often face a tough choice: 
though the market is expanding all the time, there is no way to be sure that their customers will 
stay loyal when better products available elsewhere. However, SOT believes that collaborating 
with OV would lower the risk thanks to OV’s established international reputation in the sensor 
market (a core part for not only CMs but the whole mobile phone.) 
 
From the viewpoint of OV, its venture in China depends on selecting the  correct partner to 
maximize profits and minimize risks, and cooperating with SOT can help achieve this ambition. 
As SOT’s general manager said, OV wanted to choose a Chinese enterprise which not only had 
a major market share, but also long-term development potential and competitive advantage. By 
contracting with SOT, OV can obtain the production capability and meanwhile avoid taking 
high risks on equipment investment. The general manager described the key driving force in 
the formation of strategic alliances as:  
 
“Investing heavily in equipment may cause high market risks, which could lead to the 
investment being unrecoverable due to the quick technological development and fast 
market change in the CM industry. This is the real reason for both OV and SOT choose 
alliancing to avoid investing into each other’s domain.” 
 
As a result, SOT’s choice of a strategic alliance with OV has mitigated market and investment 
risks. Two points support this claim: firstly, due to the explosive growth in smartphone demand, 
the demand for CM exceeds the supply. An insufficient supply of chips could cause a bottleneck 
in development, because of substantial investment in chip production lines. The formation of 
the strategic alliance can guarantee a stable supply. Secondly, the strategic alliance brought the 
assembler (SOT) and the chip manufacturer (OV) together, and as a result, SOT’s reputation 
has been upgraded, which has helped to guarantee a more optimistic and stable demand. In 
short, in a fast-changing industrial environment, stabilising market demand through strategic 
alliance by sharing risks plays a key role in obtaining competitive advantage for the OV-SOT 
alliance. 
 
To sum up, environmental uncertainty and high investment in equipment are the main driving 
forces for SOT and OV to form the strategic alliance in order to avoid high risks. The binding 
effects of sharing the other partner’s reputation and production capability have effectively 
reduced environmental uncertainty through the contract arrangement. This contract 
arrangement has later proved to have the function of generating competitive advantages for 
both parties.  
 
(2) Relation-specific investments and cooperative innovation  
 
For both OV and SOT, alliancing offers a great opportunity to learn from each other through a 
stable relationship and supportive cooperation. This was particularly appreciated by the chief 
R&D manager of SOT. As he noted, with the requirement for testing lenses and chips, the 
complicated assembly process requires a great deal of communication from both sides. As such, 
the formation of the alliance has provided a platform for close communication, which can 
benefit both sides greatly, not just in producing the best quality of modules, but also 
accumulating knowledge of business.  
 
Solving the technique bottleneck of encapsulation requires timely communication between 
R&D departments on both sides. As modules are assembled in SOT, most communications and 
cooperation are also carried out there. During the cooperation, SOT received significant 
technical support. OV and SOT engineers' visiting each other has been routine for some time. 
As a result, productive communication with OV helped SOT greatly improve their assembly 
precision, which in turn boosted their profit as well as reputation, which in turn has made them 
the largest lens module producer in China and a good profitable company. In other words, SOT 
has gained satisfactory relational rents from the alliance partnership with OV, and the alliance 
achievements have also attracted others (e.g. Samsung and Sony) to develop strategic alliance 
relationships with SOT.   
 
From OV’s perspective, the benefits from the alliance do not stop at the minimum of ex ante 
production risk but extend to product improvements. For example, chip designing in OV now 
requires communication with SOT before the design is finalised. In this way, OV can easily 
learn from the phone makers which are their preferred products. This is a very effective way 
for OV to learn the Chinese market, resulting a stable market share in China. The marketing 
manager of OV frankly expressed by email that the two-way learning process and iterative 
communications with SOT have brought a lot of benefits for OV.   
 
Another benefit through routine communication is that mutual trust has been established 
between SOT and OV, both in the increase of inter-firm transactions and strength of personal 
relationships between key individuals. As the market manager of SOT stressed:  
 
“Despite (formal) contracts legally put constrains on both sides, however if no 
established mutual trust, no one dare to put ‘big bets’ based on the ‘legally 
effective’ written paper and we still would maintain transaction volumes at a risk-
controllable level. In contrast, because we trust each other and care about our 
relationship, verbal promises play more and more important roles. ……Except for 
purchase agreements, no other formal written contract is necessary. This is 
because we are in the (highly uncertain) industrial environment, informal oral 
agreements are more effective.”  
 
The general manager of SOT also summarised: “We started the collaboration with  the 
motivation of sharing risks but surprisingly ended up achieving amazing mutual trust”. The 
cooperation of OV and SOT through extensive exchange of feedback on the market's uncertain 
conditions and mutual respect have enhanced competitive advantages on both sides. It has 
helped to make use of resources complementarily on both sides to meet the increasing demand 
and prevent opportunist behaviors. In other words, the cooperation has brought technological 
effects and reduced environmental uncertainty by strengthening the capabilities of the two 
partners and enabling them to face future challenges/risks. This finding supports the results 
found in Mount et al. (2015, p. 32) that there is “a strong relationship between recognitive 
capacity, network management and knowledge creation and exploration during later 
collaboration stages”. The mechanisms and relative quotes related to market uncertainty and 
innovation are listed in Table 2.  
 <Table 2 insert here> 
 
4.3 The role of contracts in safeguarding opportunism   
         
(1) Contracts constitution 
 
As we were informed by the marketing manager of SOT, there are at least three types of 
contracts signed between OV and SOT. The first signed is a ‘Memorandum’ at the very 
beginning which only states the intention of cooperation as an alliance (or on-going 
relationships if satisfied) for the first two years, with no formally enforceable obligations. 
According to the manager, the memorandum is a ‘soft’ (implicit) document as it does not oblige 
either party to supply or to purchase anything from the other. The second type is the strategic 
‘Agreement’ (or ‘Protocol’) which sets out mutual agreed terms and conditions for supply and 
purchase, including particular product quantities, discount prices and delivery times, for a 
period (e.g. one year). This agreement (contract) has ‘hard’ enforceable obligations on both 
parties specifying ex ante duties and possible ex post outcome, which assumes an efficient 
cooperation with good performance. The final type is the ‘Purchase agreement’ which sets out 
more detailed purchase transactions for a short purchase circle (e.g. three months). By our 
understanding, the ‘Contract’ discussed in Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Gilson et al. (2009) 
is similar to our strategic ‘Agreement’ in OV-SOT alliance; as such hereafter our 
discussion/analysis of formal contract refers to the second type contract mentioned (i.e. the 
‘Agreement’), however, describing the other two types of contracts will help readers 
understand the case.    
 
With regards to informal contracts, although there seems to be no explicit statement in Gilson 
et al.'s study (2009), from reading relevant literature and conducting interviews, we can define 
it as a kind of promise occasionally agreed (either orally or in writing) to commit to some 
transactions/activities. Despite it being reached informally, without enforceable obligations, 
and possibly incomplete, however, on most occasions, informal agreements can be committed 
to as they are reached based on mutual trust on each other’s behaviors/attitudes.   
 
From the discussion above, one can see a formal contract serves as a proactive contract, which 
has the characteristics of imperfection, with consideration of contingent factors, and is open 
for future supplement. In our case, the formal contract between OV and SOT  was initially only 
signed for one year. After the first year, OV and SOT came to discuss, revise and renew it for 
another year. The contract has never been renewed since, though the collaboration continues 
as usual to this day purely based on the agreed principles set in the contract. To quote the 
marketing manager, “We trust each other so it is not necessary to sign a new contract”.  
 
(2) Functions of contracts 
 
How can the formal agreements enforce or constrain both sides? Let us discuss them further.  
The first agreement was signed shortly after the memorandum, after a number of exchanges 
and on-the-spot visits. OV believed that SOT would be their best partner in China and they 
shared the same judgments on market trend. In order to ‘settle’ the cooperation, the first 
agreement was signed, serving as a promised good plan to do business jointly. After the first 
year's cooperation, they learned more about each other’s capabilities and characters and had 
strong confidence in one another; thus the second agreement was signed with larger purchasing 
intentions and more favourable pricing. In fact, the function of the second agreement can be 
thought of as a much more ambitious ‘blueprint’ for a prosperous future. In the words of the 
marketing manager: 
 
“We (OV and SOT) had strong feeling that we can do good business together, but we 
are not sure how much the other party can offer and their capabilities. So the first 
agreement is like a promise by declaring what can we offer and how can we do?  
After one year cooperation, both sides proved to be good partners with a lot of 
potential, and thus why don’t we do something much more ambitious together?”  
 
The marketing manager of SOT further explained that the formal agreement indeed includes 
contents relating to constraints in the cooperation (e.g. testing equipment and mutual technique 
support). This is because both parties understand these constraints are necessary and help 
guarantee achieving the shared aims and purpose; thus the parties are willing to obey and invest 
in relation-specific investments (e.g. iterative communications and personnel training). On the 
other hand, the formal agreement leaves quite a big space on both sides to be flexible, i.e. to 
cooperate if favourable, or exit if not. The fact that the alliance continues their cooperation thus 
far as in the past and will obviously be continuing on even without a currently valid agreement 
reveals that the function of a formal contract between OV and SOT is not to constrainfor 
cooperation, but to inform  of unperceived capabilities (the first round) and blueprint planning 
(both the first and second round). 
 
The formal contract between OV and SOT also plays the role of trust fostering. An example 
given by the marketing manager can be a good illustration of this: though the agreement set 
out purchasing amounts and associated discount prices, at the early stage when trust had not 
been established, OV still proposed to charge market price rather than agreement price before 
the agreed amounts were reached (and suggested paying back the difference after the amount 
was reached.). However, the proposal has never been actioned, as OV quickly learned the 
potential of SOT. After a market assessment, OV realized that there would be no problem in 
finishing the agreed amount, and thus charged only the agreement price even before the 
agreement amounts were reached.  This example proved that though a formal contract was in 
place, it is up to the parties involved to implement the contract, and it might not become a 
constraint on the other party, if trust has been built between parties.   
 
Along with trust building in the OV-SOT alliance and familiarity with the partner’s capabilities 
and working character, more and more informal contracting appeared to help routine operations 
and transactions. Interestingly, these informal agreements normally have a specific purpose to 
achieve certain tasks. Following the normal logic, they should be in more formal forms as these 
have less uncertainty, but trust has gradually been fostered between the parties, thus more 
efficient informal contracts are enough. This reality shows that whether formal or informal 
contracts are applied depends on the level of trust. Once trust is fostered, informal contracts 
are more effective than formal ones. In other words, in our case an informal contract is not a 
supplement to formal ones, but rather are the different outcomes of different trust levels. Once 
mutual trust is fostered, decision efficiency based on informal contracts will be improved, 
which can be seen as one side of governance effects in reducing environmental uncertainty. 
 
To sum up, the OV-SOT formal contracts served as a promise signal or positive gesture of 
cooperation when they wanted to cooperate with the other party. The purpose of contracting is 
not for constraining the parties, but establishing a common blueprint. Once mutual trust has 
been built and the cognitive uncertainty has been removed, more efficient informal contracts 
will be put in place. In contrast, the purchase agreements are in formal forms. This is because 
purchase agreements are usually zero-sum transactions, not for mutual advantage. This 
difference hints that favourable expectations may be the proper environment for a proactive 
agreement. 
 
(3) Opportunism safeguarding 
 
Thanks to good industrial conditions, there has not been any default on the agreement so far. 
However, this does not stop SOT thinking of this as a possible problem. According to the 
general manager of SOT, the decision - whether SOT continues with the agreement obligation 
by bearing costs, or stops the obligation once market demand drops significantly - should be 
purely based on economic rather than legal considerations. “No one wants to take your partner 
to court because even if you could win the lawsuit, you would lose reputation in the industry, 
[and] consequently some business.” The OV marketing manager also agreed: “the contract 
with SOT is to express our confidence in the market and the cooperation potential in the form 
of a formal document. The promises from both sides in the agreement have predictive features. 
It is normal and understandable if they are unable to deliver due to circumstance changing in 
the market. We all understand that nature. We can come to reflect and adjust them once that 
happens.”        
 
From the development of OV-SOT contracting practice (the evolution from formal to informal 
agreements), one can see that contracting for innovation contains mechanisms for benefit 
allocation and opportunism safeguarding. This is because the contracting is a continuing and 
iterative process, and any unequal benefit allocations can be compensated or adjusted for in the 
next round. If mutual trust is established and both sides treat the other party as the best partner, 
the best option is to continue the relationship and find the right way to sort the dispute out via 
communication, rather than ending the cooperation. In a similar way, hold-up problems can 
also be avoided. “Nobody wants to spend years to find and build a relationship with another 
partner. The market would not allow you to do so”, added the SOT marketing manager. In short, 
iterative gaming during cooperation can help improve alliance cooperation. Non-cooperation 
would lead to high switching costs, because the investment in established trust and competitive 
advantages would turn into a sunk cost. In this way, the arrangement of exit free is the best 
solution for opportunism and hold-up problems. This can be seen as the other side of 
governance effects in reducing environmental uncertainty. Thus, we can summarise OV-SOT 
cooperative innovation and contracting mechanisms in Figure 2:              
 
<Figure 2 insert here> 
 
5.  Comparison with the findings in Gilson et al. (2009)  
Our results reveal similarities and differences with the findings of Gilson et al. (2009). Let us 
discuss them in more detail. The OV-SOT case is also an example of vertically disintegrated 
cooperation in the upstream and downstream of the supply chain through contracting for 
innovation. Specifically, the OV-SOT alliance is closest to the Deere-Stanadyne case in terms 
of contracting practices. For example, Deere-Stanadyne’s contract “helps establish and 
maintain a long-term supply arrangement but does not obligate either party to supply or to 
purchase anything” (Gilson et al., 2009, p.458) and this (by our understanding) is similar to the 
“Memorandum” signed between OV and SOT; and even the formal “Agreement” of OV-SOT 
is implicit to some extent. Therefore, our case generally supports their findings, but we argue 
that our results have shown differences and added value to the pioneering research. Let us 
explain from three aspects:  
 (1) About the formal contract function   
 
Gilson et al. (2009) concluded that formal contracting serves as a platform to develop 
subsequent informal contracting and associated mutual trust. In contrast, our findings 
confirmed the new functions of formal contracts: under conditions where industrial prosperity 
and market uncertainty exist simultaneously and information asymmetry is strong, formal 
contracting can play a role as a promise to the other party in order to reassure the other partner 
and act as a “blueprint” for future prosperity of cooperation, rather than constraining the 
opposite side.   
 
(2) About governance mechanisms 
 
Our case analysis disagrees with the suggestion by Gilson et al. (2009) that formal contracting 
is the premise for informal contracting. In our case, when mutual trust has not been established 
or not enough, the contract appears in the formal form; while when mutual trust is mature, 
informal contracts can replace formal ones. We believe that the forms of contracts applied are 
determined by mutual trust, which stresses the key role of trust in the governance mechanism. 
In other words, an informal contract is not a supplement to a formal contract in our case: rather, 
they play the same role under different trust conditions.  
 
(3) About hold-up problems   
 
According to Gilson et al. (2009), informal arrangements should serve to constrain 
opportunistic renegotiation (which may be an extension of the supplement role); however our 
findings may suggest differences. The disclosed OV-SOT case is a successful cooperative 
alliance in the sense that both sides are very open on sensitive problems (as mentioned earlier), 
closely engaged in the whole process, communicate extensively, and they set out the possibility 
of free exit but have a strong willingness to continue the alliance cooperation. In this case, 
“hold-up” problems are not obvious (at least at the time of interviews), and there is no use of 
informal arrangements for purposes of safeguarding. We summarize these points in Table 3:  
   
<Table 3 insert here> 
 
Although the three points are drawn from a single case, they are consistently explained. 
Compared to the three cases in Gilson et al. (2009), our story represents successful cooperation 
in a strategy alliance in the current economically developing and uncertain mobile phone 
market in China. OV and SOT’s positive collaboration has gained mutual trust, which brought 
ex post benefits and minimised risks on both sides. The contracting development cannot ignore 
this background. With the consideration of this background, we are therefore able to construct 
four propositions below:    
  
 
P1: In a highly uncertain industrial environment, formal contracting can serve as a ‘promise’ 
of resource commitments to the strategic alliance from the parties involved.  
 
P2: In a highly uncertain industrial environment, mutual trust and related informal 
arrangements are the foundation of a sustainable alliance cooperation.  
 
P3: In a highly uncertain industrial environment, industrial prosperity would help foster 
mutual trust between the parties involved.  
 P4: In a highly uncertain industrial environment, iterated informal contacting and flexible exit 




Our case study reveals a story of proactive contracting for innovation. OV and SOT come from 
the emerging smartphone industry, with high uncertainty in technology and huge demands on 
industrial fixed-assets investment. Although good potential for market demand was visible, 
both parties opted to work in alliance to obtain complementary resources from the other party 
to achieve their strategic aims of maximizing profits, while minimizing costs and uncertainty. 
Through the alliance cooperation, SOT has stabilized product demand and market share by 
taking advantage of OV’s world reputation as a supplier, while OV has entered into and 
stabilized business in the exciting Chinese market by contracting ex ante with SOT (the largest 
module producer in China) to mitigate new market risks. During the collaboration, both parties 
have experienced extensive information exchange and communication via both formal 
contracts and more informal promises and understandings. These innovative channels have 
helped build mutual trust between both parties and led to 'win-win' strategic cooperation, with 
highly tacit understandings of each other, no opportunistic behaviors committed and ‘hold-up’ 
problems minimized. 
6.1 Theoretical contributions  
(1) Extension of “contracting for innovation’ theory to an emerging market like China  
 
The ‘contracting for innovation’ theory initiated by Gilson et al. (2009) can be used to explain 
alliance cooperation based on high mutual trust under the circumstance of no obvious 
opportunistic safeguarding. Their findings have addressed the deficiencies in explaining 
cooperative behaviors in other research, such as Williamson and Oliver (1991) and Lafontaine 
and Slade (2007). While Gilson et al.’s study was carried out in the US where the market is 
comparatively stable, their findings cannot be fully used to explain the phenomena we observed 
and argued in the introduction. Our study has found different functions of contracting and the 
conditions of cooperation exist in an emerging market where industrial prosperity and market 
uncertainty coexist. Our results indicate that ‘Contracting for Innovation’ can be more flexible 
and more innovative to best match with different environments. Therefore, our study has added 
explanatory power to the theory of ‘Contracting for Innovation’ in explaining strategic alliance 
cooperation between upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain.  
 
(2) Development of understanding of offset effects of environmental uncertainty on 
strategic alliance  
 
Many studies have carried out research on the environmental uncertainties around strategic 
alliances (examples see Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). Our case provides detailed 
descriptions and explanations about the innovation and mechanism of a strategic alliance in a 
highly uncertain environment. These descriptions and explanations not only describe/explain 
how uncertain risks stimulate firms to create relational rents (i.e. mutual trust), but more 
importantly, how established mutual trust helps in turn reduce environmental risk (i.e. binding 
effects), and how technological effects and governance effects reduce environmental 
uncertainty.   
 
(3) Enrich understandings of RBV and the motivation of strategic alliances    
 Many research on alliance innovations (e.g. Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Gulati, 1995; Mohr and Spekman, 1994) generally followed views from traditional 
studies such as Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993), though Teece et al. (1997)’s dynamic 
capabilities extended firms’ resources to relational and institutional resources, etc. Our case 
indicates the basis of the OV-SOT cooperation is OV’s reputation and SOT’s product 
capabilities. These factors are rarely mentioned in other studies. As such, our research on one 
hand reveals institutional factors (reputation) can help the forming of, and innovation in, 
alliances; and on the other hand, production capabilities (rather than unique capabilities) 
commonly owned by many firms also can be advantages when forming an alliance. These new 
findings have enriched the theories of RBV and the motivation for strategic alliances, and 
inspired the understanding of emerging markets where there are distances between foreign and 
domestic firms in relation to institutional factors and product capabilities.         
 
6.2 Practical implications  
 
Our results perhaps have two managerial implications: (1) although resource complementarity, 
industrial environment and market conditions are important factors to be considered ex ante 
when establishing a strategic alliance, ex post contracting for innovation practices including 
effective communications, decision making and governance are also determinants of final 
success of the alliance. (2) As long as both parties have enough shared interests in the alliance, 
it might not be necessary to worry too much about ex post opportunistic problems and hold-up 
issues because generally speaking, both sides will work hard to find suitable ways of moving 
forward.  
 
6.3 Limitations and future research  
 
Although this study has made good contributions to theories and practices, it has three major 
limitations. Firstly, this case is located in an emerging and fast-changing industry with obvious 
characteristics relating to high uncertainty in technology, growing industrial prosperity and 
huge investment in fixed assets (e.g. technical facilities). These industrial and market 
constraints would limit our findings' applicability to other industries/cases. Secondly, the 
convenience sampling strategy and the biased data5 would limit the representativeness of the 
findings. Thirdly, our case operated in China, with the special market conditions mentioned 
above; this could be good for our study to contribute to extant literature but it also means our 
study has geographical limitations. We think these limitations could motivate future research 
directions for the generalization of our findings, but need not compromise the value of our 
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Figure 1 Total sales and profit of SOT’s parent company (2009-2016, from SOT annual reports) 
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Figure 2 Cooperative innovation and contracting mechanisms reflected in OV-SOT alliance 
Table 1 Data collection  
Process  Sources Data Investigation focus  
Desk based data 
collection 
(March-April,2015) 
Archival and published materials:  
1) Public search engines (i.e. Baidu, Google); 
2) Professional database (e.g. 
China National Knowledge Infrastructure); 
3) Company websites (i.e. SOT, SG and OV websites);  
4) Hard copy materials obtained from SOT about both 
parties.  




1) Knowledge on ICT industry and technology of mobile phone CM; 
2) Background of SOT and OV. 
Pilot interview 
(April-May,2015) 
Open interview (separately): 
1) The chief marketing manager of SOT; 
 




90 mins sound 
recording each 
Journey and key events/problems in SOT-OV alliance  
1) Whole journey of SOT-OV alliance cooperation; 
2) Industrial environments; 
3) Assets items (both in advantage and inferior position by SOT and 
OV separately) in forming dynamic capabilities. 
Formal interview 
 And 
 field observation 
(May 2016) 
Semi structured interview (aggregately):  
1) A focus group consisting of the general manager, the 
chief marketing manager and the chief R&D 
manager of SOT; 
2) Visiting production lines and different departments.    
  
120 mins sound 
recording and 
notes taken by the 1st 
author 
 
Contracting and innovation process 
1) SOT-OV alliance strategy and key events/problems;  
2) Contracting events and cooperation activities; 
3) Confirming the truth of the cooperation through field observations. 
Peer confirmation 
(June-July, 2016) 
External peers interview (separately): 
Two external peers in the same industry;  
 
45 mins sound 
recording each 
Peers’ perceptions 
1) On environmental and industrial atmosphere; 






Focused update interview (separately): 
1) The chief marketing manager of SOT (face to face); 
2) The general manager of SOT (in telephone); 
3) The marketing manager of OV (by e-mail). 
 
(1) 45 mins sound 
recording; (2) 20 
mins sound 
recording; (3) email 
confirmations on a 
number of key issues. 
 
Contracting and innovation process 
1) Contents about contracts; 
2) The relationship between formal and informal contracts;* 
3) The substantial constrains and functions of contracts;* 
4) Forms and contents about investment in information; 
5) Personal perspectives on the opportunist and hold-up problems;* 
6) The effects of environment on contracts and cooperation.* 







Table 2 Environmental uncertainty and alliance collaboration effects  




complementarities to avoid 
high risk in investment  
“Mobile industry changes too fast. If wait until we can have chip production capability, the market would not be there anymore.” 
(Marketing Manager of SOT) 
 
“Chip and lens are two key parts in video camera. Both OV and SOT can solely produce the module (i.e. the combination of lens 
and chip), however in that scenario, each side has to bear high risk in heavy investment in special equipment. We chose the alliance 
to avoid the risks as OV has chip capability and we have lens technique.” (R&D Manager of SOT)  
 
“Investing heavily in equipment may cause high market risks, which could lead to the investment being unrecoverable due to the 
quick technological development and fast market change in the CM industry. This was the main reason of OV and SOT working as 








“Chip manufacturers would influence more on customers. When customers choose the models, they concern the brand of chip. Our 
cooperation with OV allows us to share the market with higher certainty. The binding is helpful for both sides, especially for us….I 
think, firstly, OV cares about our production capability; secondly technological level for production capability plays an important 
role in reducing uncertainty in transforming technology into profit.” (Marketing Manager of SOT) 
 
“We cannot afford stock out (unforeseeable short of supply). By contracting with OV, we can guarantee the supply of main part 
when it is out of stock…. For OV, the cooperation has reduced the risks because the quantities of products are ensured for big 
Chinese market demand. For us, we earn profits much higher than we could do by ourselves and also avoid risks on investing in 
equipment.” (Marketing Manager of SOT) 
  
Relation specific 
investment leads mutual 
trust which can reduce 
market uncertainty through 
improving decision 
efficiency and restraining 
opportunism.   
“Mutual trust means fewer rounds of communication and confirmation, thus improved efficiency of decision, and therefore, lower 
level of market uncertainty (because of earlier adjustments) and lower level of inter-organizational uncertainty (because of higher 
mutual trust).” (General Manager of SOT)  
 
“There should be no problem that SOT can drop out of the cooperation with OV at any time, and we also believe that OV also 
shares this idea. However we do not want losing the valuable investments in bilateral relationship. The investment not only raised 
our (SOT) assemble precision, more importantly, mutual trust. Without trust, we are unable to communicate so smooth and make 
timely decisions. This is the most treasured relationship in CM industry. It is the mutual understanding and trust rather than using a 








Table 3 Differences between the findings of Gilson et al.（2009）and of this research 
 Findings in Gilson et al.（2009） Findings in this research 
Functions of formal Contract 
 
Formal contract plays as a platform of mutual cooperation 
“……formal contracting operates importantly to facilitate the development of informal 
contracting structures that police the parties' expectations of capability, cooperation, and 
trust（P472）.” 
Under information asymmetry, 
formal contract serves as a ‘promise’ 
to the other party and a description of 
“blueprint” for future prosper of 
cooperation.  
 
Governance mechanism Contract operates entirely as a governance structure 
“……the contract operates entirely as a governance structure that facilitates learning about 
the parties' capabilities(P477).” 
“……explicit mechanisms with respect to collaboration and dispute resolution（P479）.” 
Mutual trust serves as governance 
structure while contracting is only the 
form and representativeness of 
mutual trust.  
 
Hold-up problem  Informal arrangement to constrain opportunistic renegotiation  
“The continued presence of uncertainty makes impossible the ex ante allocation of ex post 
decision power through assigning to one party options to take action like termination. For the 
project to work, the parties must rely on an informal arrangement to constrain opportunistic 
renegotiation of the division of the value created.” (P474)  
 
Iterate informal contacting and 
flexible exit can ensure a stable 
alliance relationship with no need to 
negotiate ex ante for benefit 
distribution. 
  
 
 
